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Fernando H. Cardoso* 
The general relationship existing between develop-
ment and the environment may be approached at 
various analytical levels and from different angles. 
In this article it is explored in the specific case of 
modern-day Brazil and in the framework of its style 
of development, which the author describes as one 
of 'associated dependence ' . Having thus defined 
his object of study, he focuses his attention upon the 
consequences of the development style on the ener-
gy issue, the spatial distribution of the population 
and the development of the Amazon basin. 
After sketching the broad lines of the 'associ-
ated dependence ' style of development, he goes on 
to the problems raised by the energy issue, as well as 
the different possible solutions to them, which hinge 
on the petroleum economy, its replacement by other 
energy sources and the reformulation of the crucial 
questions of who consumes energy and why. 
There then follows a critical interpretation of 
the urbanization process in Brazil, in which the cen-
tral argument is that the process has shattered the 
equil ibrium between city and countryside without 
having managed at the same time to create cities 
with a truly modem urban environment. 
The final section is devoted to a discussion of 
the strategy followed in developing the Amazon 
basin, the close link between that strategy and the 
prevailing style of development and the concomitant 
negative consequences for the conservation of natu-
ral resources. The author also stresses, however, the 
importance which the abundant renewable re-
sources of the Amazon region might have for a strate-
gy which could develop the area without destroying 
its wealth; but he is aware that a new strategy of that 
kind would call for the trans formation of the prevail-
ing style of development. 
*Fonner ILPES staff member and currently Director of 
the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP), 
Brazil. 
Introduction 
Brazil's economic development over the past 
years is often pointed to as a successful case of 
industrialization and social change occurring 
on the periphery of the international capitalist 
system. At all events, it is not the only such case 
since, to varying degrees and with differing 
patterns of integration in the world economy, 
Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Singapore, 
Korea, India, etc., are other examples. It is 
clear, however, that there are many ambigui-
ties in this matter. Even though in all of these 
cases the manufacturing sector was integrated 
with the world economy, and consequently 
they represent different forms of the interna-
tionalization of capitalist production, there are 
great differences in the significance of indus-
trialization based on a manufacturing-export 
platform and industrialization which creates a 
local consumer market. 
Brazilian industrialization is a 'success-
ful' example of the second type of economic 
integration. This aspect was often neglected in 
analyses, because at the height of Brazil's in-
ternationalizing type of economic expansion, 
there was an intense process of export growth 
and wage compression, especially between 
1964 and 1968, although without major change 
until 1975. Some hasty analysts saw this as 
proof of the existence of a manufacturing-ex-
port development strategy. 
Today, it is easy to see that both the com-
pression of wages and the export strategy were 
central guidelines of the development policy 
implemented by the military governments. 
The first of these, however, did not mean that it 
was impossible to create domestic markets, nor 
was the second the result of such an impossibil-
ity. 
Certainly, wages declined and the labour 
force was increasingly exploited, which al-
lowed the enterprises to reconstitute their fi-
nancial capital and had the additional effect of 
attracting multinational corporations (which 
were also motivated by the need to compete 
with the emerging local industry and to survive 
protectionism, and by the strong incentives and 
direct and indirect subsidies which they re-
ceived from the State). But despite this fact, the 
consumption of "wage goods" continued to 
grow (which is easily understandable in view 
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of the incorporation of new contingents of 
workers: around 1 million new jobs created 
annually in and outside of industry) and there 
was an enormous expansion of" the stratum of 
durable goods consumers due to the growth of 
the middle- and high-income sectors and the 
concentration of income among the latter. Fur-
thermore, inter-firm consumption increased 
greatly, and public spending grew substan-
tially. 
All of this ensured the expansion of the 
domestic market, which grew at rates even 
higher than the already high rates of export 
growth. 
Why, then, the emphasis on the export 
strategy? 
Firstly, it must be stressed that although 
the expansion of international trade from 1947/ 
1948 to 1973 was generalized and part of the 
internationalization of the production system, 
from the point of view of the Brazilian econo-
my's need for growth exports were necessarily 
a priority. This was because industrialization 
took place within the framework of a process 
called 'associated dependence' : What did this 
process consist of? 
It was land-reform style of development 
which, by structurally linking the local econo-
my to international production, reversed the 
previous course of industrialization: up to the 
mid-1950s, the strategy of the industrializing 
process sought to avoid 'external dependence' 
and to generate a transformation which would 
affect society as a whole. Although no concrete 
land reform measures had been taken, the po-
litical pressure for them existed. The State de-
veloped the so-called 'basic' sectors of the 
economy. Perceptible symptoms of a change in 
this strategy were visible during the govern-
ment of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-196.0), 
when the target plan envisaged, together with 
'basic ' industrialization, the rapid installation 
of consumer durable industries, especially the 
automobile industry. In addition, new foreign 
investment began to enter the country as a re-
sult of the new international division of produc-
tion adopted by multinational corporations. 
This took place initially in response to officiai 
incentives and to secure markets, and subse-
quently, because the expansion of the markets 
encouraged them to plough back their profits. 
After military coups (1964 and 1968) ensured 
some political stability through repression, and 
policies for wage control and industrialization 
subsidies were adopted, it became possible 
both for financial capital to guarantee the loans 
necessary for industrialization, and for the pro-
duction capital of European and Japanese mul-
tinational corporations to compete with that of 
the United States corporations in Brazilian in-
dustrialization. 
During this process, the basic industrial-
ization plans were not discarded, but the rates 
were reversed, with final consumption prod-
ucts growing more rapidly than 'basic' prod-
ucts. In order to obtain quick results, a mecha-
nism leading to ever-increasing structural de-
pendence was built into the development strat-
egy; the growth rates of the product required 
increased imports of equipment and basic in-
dustrial inputs which the country lacked, petro-
leum being first among them.1 
How was the cost of this process to be cov-
ered? By exporting both primary products and 
semi-manufactured and finished goods in pace 
with the growth of the international market. 
Exports were a fundamental goal in this 
•This statement may not be considered categorical, as 
in fact die relative growth of capital goods and consumer 
durables varied according to the cycle and the policies 
applied by the various governments from 1964 to the pres-
ent; but it applies more to the period until 1970. From 1970 
to 1973, although the expansion of the consumer durables 
sector continued to be extremely vigorous, the rising trend 
in the growth rate of the capital goods sector was already 
apparent, and from 1974 onwards it was double that oí the 
consumer durables sector. Ministry of Planning of the State 
of Sâo Paulo (SEPLAN), O examen das políticas económi-
cas sectorials, Sao Paulo, 1979. 
It should be noted, however, that despite the growth of 
the capital and intermediate goods sector, if the consumer 
goods sector expanded rapidly then the domestic supply of 
the former would be inadequate and inputs and equipment 
would have to be imported, as was in fact the case. 
The increase in the import coefficient for capital goods 
is related to the growth in the rate of investment in industry, 
which climbed from 25.2% in 1965 to 4 1 % in 1971/1972, 
subsequently returning to the previous levels (SEPLAN, 
op. cit., p. 90). In this connexion, see F. Mazzucchelli, A 
expansáo inconclusa: consideraçoes sobre o sector de bens 
de capital no Brasil, UNICAMP (mimeographed docu-
ment), 1977. Thus, it may be noted that the import coeffi-
cient for capital goods increased in real terms up to 1975, 
despite the fact that the relative prices of domestic capital 
goods were lower than the prices of those that were im-
ported. 
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growth model, and this goal could be achieved 
because the international market was expand-
ing rapidly. The need to import was also in-
herent in the model, in view of the priority 
given to the substitution of imports of finished 
consumer products and the creation of new 
consumer needs, for which the country lacked 
both the technology and the necessary equip-
ment and inputs. It was imperative to export in 
order to pay for a development model which 
started where the advanced economies ended, 
acting in reverse fashion. 
The State played an essential role in the 
formation of new strata of consumers, concen-
trating revenues through policies which 
worked not only by controlling wages but also 
by making financing easier so as to create the 
market required for the type of industrializa-
tion which was being imposed. Major funds 
were diverted from social objectives to finance 
enterprises as well as directly to underwrite 
consumption by higher-income groups. More-
over, the very expansion of some bureaucratic 
sectors broadened this type of market. 
In this way, the industrialization model 
that was adopted not only tied the local econo-
my to multinational corporations, but also 
shaped the 'development style': income con-
centration, technological dependence, the 
need for growing imports and consequently for 
growing exports, and a role which was not just 
active but decisive for action by the State, 
which co-ordinated the entire process. 
With regard to the latter aspect, the charac-
teristics of Brazilian economic expansion must 
be clearly understood. After 1955, and espe-
cially from 1964 to 1967, the direction of the 
process of accumulation (in the sense that such 
investment 'drives' the economy) took place 
through the transnational corporations, but the 
process and its integration were both under-
pinned by the expansion of the State sector of 
the economy, with both the State sector and the 
private national sector becoming integrated in 
the multinationalized economy through associ-
ation and complementarity. The»three pillars of 
development are the State, national and multi-
national corporations, under the 'command' of 
the latter. 
What do we mean by 'command' here? 
First, that transnational corporations make in-
vestments in the sectors which expand most 
rapidly and yield the greatest profits. Second, 
that even when the regulation of the economy 
and the production of basic inputs depend on 
the State, and State enterprises are in partner-
ship with the private national and foreign sec-
tor through joint ventures, what is produced is 
still determined by the pattern of civilization 
created by the capitalism of the multinational 
corporations, and production methods depend 
on the technology pertaining to them. More-
over, the financial capacity to sustain invest-
ment is determined by the world system, and as 
for the financing of consumption, either it 
comes indirectly from the international sector, 
or it involves the diversion of social funds. 
In this way, the 'associated dependence' 
model of industrialization not only generates 
structural ties between the domestic and exter-
nal sectors, but also shapes the way in which 
local and State enterprises must function, even 
though it leaves the latter important roles in 
accumulation. It transforms State enterprises 
from 'public service' enterprises to 'private-
style' organizations: they are associated with 
multinational corporations, operate within the 
market as private companies, pursue profit and 
incorporate the operating methods of the large 
corporations. In very general terms, this is the 
style of development wich the Brazilian case 
successfully exemplifies. 
This 'model' worked reasonably well up 
to 1974, when the decline in international trade 
and the rise in petroleum prices became se-
rious obstacles. The Brazilian economy needed 
to continue to import in order to continue to 
grow. When the rate or value of exports de-
creased, the external debt rose rapidly, today 
totalling US$ 55 billion. Around US$ 7 billion 
per year, equivalent to a very high proportion of 
exports, are needed in order to pay for debt 
servicing alone. The interest rate on new loans 
rose, and the domestic rate reflected this. 
Moreover, domestic financial speculation 
increased greatly, and the domestic debt also 
grew more rapidly. This, together with the 
government's non-reproductive projects, the 
need to reimburse international financial capi-
tal at growing interest rates and world inflation 
which affected the price of imports, produced 
sharp inflationary pressure. 
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It is in this context that the functioning of 
the 'Brazilian model ' must be evaluated with 
respect to the matters which decisively affect 
the 'environment ' , it being understood that 
the latter is determined not only by a physical 
base which sustains economic development 
and is affected by it, but also by a life style 
which affects human beings. 
In this article, in addition to discussing the 
problem of alternatives, we shall illustrate 
merely a few of the major problems which the 
development style that was adopted has gener-
ated. We will not discuss other crucial prob-
lems, such as the manner in which the process 
of rapid, unregulated growth has affected the 
various social classes and led to unequal oppor-
tunities for enjoying both manufactured and 
natural goods. All of the available data demon-
strate that social inequality and class exploita-
tion are intensifying and creating serious prob-
lems in the country. At all events, we shall limit 
ourselves to discussing the effects that this 
style of development has on the energy prob-
lem, the spatial distribution of the population 
and the manner in which new areas are incor-
porated into the country's economic space. 
It is not difficult to justify the choice of 
these issues: the petroleum shortage and the 
definition of a growth strategy based on that 
resource place a very serious obstacle before 
development prospects; accelerated urbaniza-
tion and migration from the country to the city, 
intimately linked both to the strategy of poles of 
wealth for development and to the absence of 
effective policies for the provision of social in-
frastructure in rural areas, are another outstand-
ing aspect of the 'Brazilian' (and Latin Amer-
ican) style of development; finally, with res-
pect to the development of new regions, it is 
extremely important to point out that Brazil is 
one of the countries which is growing indus-
trially, yet which simultaneously retains an 
'agricultural frontier'. This is another great 
problem for the future of developmental conti-
nuity. For this reason, we have selected the-
case of the Amazon basin to illustrate how new 
areas are developed, and the environmental, 
social and economic consequences. 
In 1940, 80% of Brazil's energy consump-
tion came from the 'biomass' (energy derived 
from organic matter), 5% from coal and the rest 
from hydroelectricity. Today, electricity repre-
sents nearly one-fourth of the total, the use of 
coal has remained stable and the biomass has 
been replaced by petroleum.2 
Even superficial observation shows that a 
'modernization' of the country's energy sector 
took place. But what does it consist of? Basi-
cally, the replacement of energy sources de-
rived from the biomass (renewable) by non-
renewable fossil fuels (coal and petroleum) 
which, moreover, the country does not produce 
in sufficient amounts. Moreover, the answer to 
the question of who consumes this energy is 
2Lecttire given by José Goldemberg in Porto Alegre, 
17 April 1979; quoted from the mimeographed version. 
I 
The economic model and the energy problem 
It is unnecessary to stress unduly the fact that 
the current demand for energy was determined 
by the development style described in the pre-
ceding pages, which radically modified the 
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implicit in the characteristics of the 'Brazilian 
development model'.3 
1. The transport system has come to 
depend directly on automobiles and trucks, 
which has necessitated the construction of an 
enormous and costly roadway infrastructure 
and an increase in the proportion of liquid fuel 
within total energy consumption. It has been 
calculated that in 1978, 96% of passengers and 
70% of freight were transported by road.4 It is 
worthwhile noting that "transport" accounts 
for 9 8 % of the consumption of gasoline and 73% 
of that of diesel fuel. 
2. In manufacturing, the principal con-
sumers of petroleum-based fuels and of elec-
tricity were the following, by order of size of 
consumption: 
It may be noted that with the exception of 
'food, beverages and tobacco' and 'textiles, 
clothing and footwear', the share of these sec-
tors in the total value of national manufacturing 
output is relatively low: 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF PROCESSING 
INDUSTRIES IN THE TOTAL VALUE 
OF OUTPUT 
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Food, beverages and 
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Textiles, clothing and 
footwear 
Non-metallic minerals 
3 The evaluations differ: for example, in "Energía no 
Brasil", José Goldemberg calculates consumption as fol-
lows: industrial use, 29%; domestic and commercial use, 
5 3 % ; and transport, 18%. 
With respect to energy consumption by the transport 
sector, it is worth giving other significant data: 
Inland transport of goods in various countries (1960) 
3. Energy consumption in the various re-
gions of the country was extremely uneven: 
BRAZIL: POPULATION AND ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION, BY REGION, 1975 
Electrical energy Petroleum 
Popu- MWh/year Litres/ 

































France Italy USRR USA many Brazil 
Railway 58 29 86 38 
River 11 1 6 44 









Source: Reproced from J. Goldemberg (in consultation 
with Robert H. Williams), Energy Strategies for Developed 
and Less Developed Countries, Center for Environmental 
Studies, Princeton University Press, 1978, Table XV. 
4Data from "A Política Energética de Oposicao", 
mimeographed publication, 1979. 
Source: José Goldemberg (in consultation with Ro-
bert H. Williams), Energy Strategies for Developed 
and Less Developed Countries, op. cit. 
I feel it is necessary to introduce more data 
so as to illustrate the extent to which the eco-
nomic development model based on the rapid 
diffusion of consumer durables, the concentra-
tion of income and regional inequality relies 
upon the distribution of energy consumption, 
which has increased as rapidly as economic 
growth itself: 
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BRAZIL: PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
(In thousands ofETPs: equivalent tons of petroleum) 
Year Petroleum Hydro-
electricity 





























Source: Ministry of Mining and Energy, Balanço energético nacional, 1978. 
With respect to production, the biomass 
was replaced by petroleum as a source of ener-
gy, coal has not increased significantly as an 
input, and hydroelectricity is expanding at a 
reasonable rate: in fact, its growth has been 
notable. In 1967, thermal electricity repre-
sented 20% of the entire installed electrical 
capacity, whereas in 1977 in represented bare-
ly 15.8%. Total energy consumption in 1976 
was 77 631 gWh (705 kWh per capita, whereas 
the projection for average Brazilian per capita 
consumption for the year 2000 may be calcu-
lated at around 1 678 kWh/inhabitant, equiva-
lent to the current consumption pattern in 
Western Germany). 
The country's hydroelectricity potential is 
considered more than adequate to cover fore-
seeable consumption, if the energy consump-
tion profile determined by the current 'style of 
development ' is maintained. 
However, potential energy sources are not 
interchangeable. Liquid hydrocarbons, de-
rived from petroleum and coal, are only par-
tially replaceable by electricity, and only for 
industrial consumption. The critical problem 
of their production therefore arises. 
The data indicate another significant factor 
supporting the view that the energy balance 
reflects the style of development. The National 
Energy Balance for 1978 indicates that 83% of 
the petroleum consumed is imported, and 40% 
of total energy consumed is imported, wherein 
37% corresponds to petroleum and 3% to coal. 
Brazil spends US$ 5 billion per year on petro-

































Source: ELETROBRAS (Antonio Coló, Depto. Etu-
dos Energéticos; Antonio Carlos Tatit Holtz, Depto. 
Geracao and Joao Carlos R. de Albuquerque, Depto. 
Etudos Energéticos; a work submitted to the Bra-
zilian Energy Conference in Rio de Janeiro, De-
cember 1978). 
«Inventory based on topographical surveys in the 
areas and minimum ratios in 40 years. 
' 'Estimates based on aerial photographic surveys and 
minimum flows in 40 years. 
c'Half of the potential was calculated in the case of 
b i national usage. 
In sum, the development options have led 
to a dangerous external dependency in energy, 
all so as to create a style of development which, 
according to the physicist José Goldemberg (as 
well as the experience of the man in the street) 
asphyxiates the urban population with pollu-
tion, while annoying it with the problem of 
private transport, and catches us all up in the 
infernal merry-go-round which leads us to 
consume more and more liquid fuel that we do 
not produce. 
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If until 1973 one could still believe that, for 
good or for ill, there were no limits to the de-
velopment of the pattern of civilization which 
'modernity ' symbolizes, since then the situa-
tion has changed. The 'partial exhaustion' of 
petroleum reserves has come to be recognized 
as an irreversible trend in the contemporary 
world. It is irrelevant for our purposes whether 
this exhaustion is physical, or a political 
problem; the fact is that a 'growing deficit' is 
expected after 1982. 
Faced with this situation, the Government 
has had to propose alternative solutions to the 
energy problem. The matter was postponed 
and delayed for many years, finally surfacing 
with force in 1979. The problem was brought 
up in the following terms in a presidential 
statement in early July: together with com-
bating inflation and the stimulation of agricul-
ture, the energy problem wich affected the 
balance of payments was becoming a priority; 
measures both to restrict consumption and to 
replace petroleum and its products with local 
products were called for. 
From the proposal of the 'new energy poli-
cy', it became evident that from the point of 
view of hydroelectricity there were no con-
straints on future development, and although 
the nuclear programme would complement 
that type of energy, its weight would be rela-
tively reduced on the whole.5 Therefore, the 
crucial matter is that oïpetroleum substitution. 
Indeed, local petroleum output in relation 
to consumption is estimated as follows: 
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Source: A. Almeida Rocha et al., "Petróleo e carváo mineral na política energética brasileira", 1977 (mimeo-
graphed). 
«These data were taken from the above source, which is a careful study. For the projections from 1978 
onwards, account was taken of the future decline of current producers at an annual rate of 3% as well as the 
contribution of new wells, approximately 210 000 bbl/day as from 1980, with an annual growth of 10% 
be tween 1980 and 1985. 
Under these conditions, the Government 
must, in the final analysis face three non-exclu-
sive alternatives: to promote petroleum substi-
tution, to promote petroleum saving (through 
rationing and appropriate pricing policies), or 
to change the style of development itself. For 
the moment, in view of the rigidity of the asso-
ciated dependence model, it must be expected 
that the policies proposed will relate to the first 
two. 
If we begin with the problem of greater 
economy in petroleum use and of pricing poli-
cies, we must point out that in general, waste is 
an essential element of the current style of de-
velopment. Of course, there is general waste in 
all energy production and its consumption, for 
5Since it is beyond the purpose of this work, we will 
not discuss the complex problem of nuclear energy, which 
has so many uncertain and negative effects on the environ-
ment and on the determinants of the country's policy. In 
energy terms it is necessary to note that nuclear production 
does not replace liquid hydrocarbons and that, as a supple.-
ment for hydroelectricity, it would at best cover 10% of the 
total by the year 2000. 
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technological reasons relating to energy gener-
ation and transmission. A semi-official docu-
ment admits that "56% of the country's raw 
energy is lost when it is transformed into usable 
energy, a quantity sufficiently large to warrant 
measures to improve the efficiency of transfor-
mation".6 In addition to this loss, both electrici-
ty and petroleum are over-used due to architec-
ture that is inappropriate for individual trans-
port, irrational urban plans deriving from real 
estate speculation, etc.; in short, the incidental 
costs of the capitalist model of development 
—incidental to the model, but integral parts of 
the system. 
Nothing significant has been done or pro-
posed in this respect. The Government expects 
to impose petroleum saving and relative con-
trol of waste through the pricing policy which, 
so far, has been subsidizing consumption. It 
may seem senseless (and it is, from many points 
of view) but, for example, 'modernization', the 
expansion of the automobile industry, leads to 
the following contradiction: in a poor country 
lacking in petroleum, prices are subsidized. 
T h e following table provides insights for eval-
uating the relative scope of the price subsi-
dizing policy: 
SUBSIDIES AND INVESTMENTS 
IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 
Billions of Cr$ 
Approximate value of the subsidy tor 
LPG diesel fuel, fuel oils and 
gasoline in 1978 24.0 
1978 investments in Itaipu 
Binational 15.0 
1978 investments in Furnas 
Electricity Power Staions 9.9 
"Pro-alcohol" programme up to 
February 1979 6.9 
Source: M. F. Thompson Motta, "Problemática Energéti-
ca de Atualidade Brasileira", in O Estado de Sâo Paulo, 8 
April 1979. Subsidies were calculated tor an annual de-
mand oí' 15 billion litres at the rate ot'CrSi 1,6 per litre set by 
the National Petroleum Council. 
T h i s year , ' r e la t ive aus ter i ty ' m e a s u r e s a re 
being taken: prices are rising significantly and 
service stations are closed in the evenings, on 
Sundays and on holidays. This is all part of an 
at tempt to limit the level of imports to 960 000 
barrels per day, which is extremely high and 
burdensome. 
With respect to replacement of naphta by 
other hydrocarbons, the policies which are cur-
rently being discussed provide the following 
options: firstly, the decision has already been 
reached to mix naphta with 20% alcohol, the 
latter being produced through sugar-cane fer-
mentation (ethanol); gradually replacing petro-
leum with coal and charcoal; mixing 20% gaso-
line into diesel fuel, to the extent that there is a 
surplus of the latter because of the use of alco-
hol; and mixing 7% anhydrous alcohol with 
diesel fuel (statement by the Ministry of Min-
ing and Energy, O Estado de Sào Paulo, 12 July 
1979). 
An extremely interesting possibility arises 
from this group of measures. In practice, Brazil 
must decide, in the next five years, how to har-
monize its external dependence in the field of 
energy and its own style of development since, 
as we have seen, both of these aspects are inter-
related. There is a possibility of replacing 
naphta with alcohol, which is technically feasi-
ble but implies additional options: it is neces-
sary to reconsider the production engineering 
of combustion engines and to cope with serious 
problems connected with both alcohol supply 
and distribution (since it is more corrosive than 
gasoline) and with the technology for its extrac-
tion. 
These problems are being debated inten-
sively; there is a desire to create or develop a 
technology (that of sugar-cane alcohol which is 
currently in use was imported 30 or 40 years 
ago, and has already been totally absorbed by 
local producers) and to opt for new directions. 
In this sense, the biomass may be revalued as 
an energy source through the use of sugar cane 
and eucalyptus or pine for alcohol extraction 
''Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Department oí 
Industrial Technology, 1979 (mimeographed document), 
p. 6. 
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(methanol). According to José Goldemberg, 
this had made it possible to "take the indispu-
table lead in a field of vanguard technology" 
(op. cit., p. 9). Since in the production of alco-
hol, whether from sugar cane (ethanol) or from 
eucalyptus or pine forests, energy is also con-
sumed, it is necessary to investigate the rela-
tive advantages more thoroughly. On a prelimi-
nary assessment based on reasonable hypothe-






















Sugar cane (ethanol) 
Eucalyptus (methanol) 
Pine (methanol) 
Source: Lecture by José Goldemberg, op. cit. 
Thus, the development of a plan for using 
the biomass requires new technological deci-
sions, the adaptation to the local production 
technology of methanol alcohol distilleries (if 
this is the solution) and the discussion of agri-
cultural problems involved in each alternative 
(sugar cane requires very fertile land, and in 
order to meet energy needs the crop would 
have to occupy nearly one-third of the land 
currently cultivated as well as one-third of the 
labour force). 
To some extent, the bottleneck caused by 
the petroleum crisis raises the problem of the 
future of the Brazilian economy. The crisis may 
be solved using the alternatives suggested, 
based on the country's material resources; but 
this would imply revising the style of develop-
ment, since it calls for the creation or devel-
opment of new kinds of production technology 
and in the final analysis leads to a change in an 
essential component of the existing framework 
of structural dependence. 
Obviously, the solution of the energy crisis 
through a more intensive utilization of the bio-
mass using new technology does not solve the 
global problem of the style of development nor 
that of its relationship with the environment. At 
best, it must be recalled that the production of 
sugar-cane alcohol generates an extremely pol-
luting by-product which is currently responsi-
ble for the 'death' of many rivers. Studies have 
been made on ways to transfonn this residue 
into fertilizer, bu t the subjectmustbe research-
ed more thoroughly and the plans must be eco-
nomically viable. Strictly speaking, the prob-
lem remains that an energy plan based on the 
use of alcohol would require financial efforts 
over a long period, during which external de-
pendence in energy matters would continue to 
be considerable. And there is still the crucial 
problem that attempts are being made to re-
place naphta by alcohol so as to sustain the 
same style of development. Finally, the alcohol 
plan cannot replace the fundamental option 
with regard to energy dependence, which re-
lates to the industrial consumption of fuels and 
not gasoline. 
Consequently, the basic choices must not 
be restricted to the analysis of technological 
substitutes: they must take fully into account 
the pattern of civilization which answers the 
questions of who consumes energy and for 
what purpose. 
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II 
The Urban Problem 
Another stricking characteristic of Brazilian-
development is rapid urbanization. This trait is 
common throughout Latin America, although 
there are differences in this case: instead of 
occurring according to the model of the pri-
mate city, urbanization leads to a distribution 
of cities according to the 'rank size pattern.7 
In other words, whereas in most Latin Ameri-
can countries there is an enormous urban con-
centration in a single city (the capital city), in 
the Brazilian case the distribution among the 
cities in the various regions is more balanced. 
In relative terms, the urban concentration in 
Rio de Janeiro and Sâo Paulo, the two largest 
cities in Brazil, is declining as a proportion of 
urban concentrations of 20 000 inhabitants or 
more, sinking from 52.8% in 1920 to 28.1% in 
1970. 
In the recent urbanization process, the 
creation of many cities and the proliferation of 
populations of more than 20 000 inhabitants are 
noticeable. There were 74 of these in 1920; by 
1950 they had increased only to 85, in 1960 
jumping to 155 and in 1970, to 270. In 1950 
there were only three cities with more than 
500 000 inhabitants, and in 1970there were 11. 
Consideration of the growth rates provides 
a dynamic view of this process, as shown in the 
following table. 
BRAZIL: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH IN LARGE CITIES OF 100 000 OR MORE 
INHABITANTS IN 1970, BY TYPE OF CITY, 1960-1970 
Type of city No. 
Percentage of the group 
within total urban 
population in cities of 




1. Municipalities of Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo 2 
2. Municipalities of other metropolitan 
regions (MR) 7 
3. Non-metropolitan cities of 
250 000 inhabitants or more 6 
4. Cities of 100 000 or more inhabitants 
in metropolitan regions 13 
5. Cities of 100 000-250 000 inhabitants 
outside the MR: 
(a) Northeast 8 
(b) Sâo Paulo 8 
(c) Miscellaneous 16 
























7In this respect see Vilmar Faria, "O Sistema Urbano 
Brasilero: um resumo das características e tendencias re-
centes", in Estudos CEBRA? No. 18, Sao Paulo, 1976. The 
data used later are taken from this article. 
This rapid and widespread urbanization 
process naturally reflects the nature of the 
process of Brazil's economic growth, which 
traditionally took place through agricultural 
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export cycles which traversed the country's 
territory from north to south, according to the 
weight of various tropical products (sugar cane, 
cocoa, coffee, rubber, etc.) and of mining activi-
ty in the export booms. But what is particularly 
noteworthy is that recently urbanization was 
linked l?oth to industrialization (which was not 
entirely concentrated from the spatial point of 
view) and to agriculture and services. Vilmar 
Faria has pointed this out, and especially the 
fact that the urban population expanded faster 
than industrial employment in the north, oen-
tral-west and northeast, whereas the opposite 
was true in the southeast and the south. 
At any rate, it would be wrong not to stress 
the relatively less spatially concentrated pat-
tern ofBrazilían urbanization and the fact that it 
is not only accelerated industrialization which 
leads to urbanization. The division of labour 
between city and country and the concentra-
tion of urban population also took place in 
Brazil as a function of the capitalization of 
agriculture. This is what happened with coffee 
in Sao Paulo and is currently taking place with 
soya, and in a more general manner with the 
expulsion of the share croppers from the ran-
ches and the formation of a rural proletariat (the 
boias-frias) inhabiting small- and middle-sized 
urban agglomerations. The formation of urban 
nuclei may even be observed in pioneering 
activities. 
Clearly, the high growth rates of the urban 
population do not reflect solely the natural 
growth of the population. Migrations continue 
to characterize the spatial distribution of the 
population. 
METROPOLITAN REGIONS: 
TOTAL AND MIGRANT POPULATIONS, 1970 
Metropolitan regions 
Greater Sao Paulo 








8 139 730 
6 891521 
1 729 127 
1645 519 
1 548 140 




4 306 625 














Source: IBGE, Censo Demográfico de 1970. 






Greater Belo Horizonte 
Greater Rio de Janeiro 
Greater Sào Paulo 
Greater Curitiba 
























































Source: R. Vas da Costa, "A explosao demográfica no mundo e no Brazil", BNH, Río de Janeiro, 
1973, p. 41. 
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METROPOLITAN AREAS (1970): ORIGIN AND CURRENT DOMICILE 
OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION 
Areas 
Greater Sâo Paulo 









4 306 625 



























Source: IBCE, Censo Demográfico de 1970, apud. C. Spindel, Metropolizaçâo e Recur-
sos Humanos, Cuadernos CEBRAP, No. 25. 
It may be noted that the population is in-
tensively redistributing itself among cities, al-
though certain provinces continue to lose pop-
ulation and new zones are emptying (particu-
larly in the northeast, Minas Gérais and Espíri-
tu Santo), which is caused not only by econom-
ic stagnation but also particularly, and especial-
ly in the areas of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do 
Sul (which are also losing their population), by 
the manner in which capitalism in agriculture 
is progressing. 
The purpose of this brief frame of refer-
ence is to analyze the distribution of the popu-
lation and to highlight and debunk certain 
aspects of the current economic development 
process. In reality, much has been said regard-
ing the accelerated urbanization of Latin Amer-
ica; few regions in the world have such a drastic 
separation between the rural and urban style of 
life. In Europe and the United States there is a 
certain continuity between the two styles, and 
it is only in the large cities that a global opposi-
tion arises, facilitating the creation of an 'unna-
tural space' which serves as the basis for the 
typical life of industrial societies. 
In Latin America, in contrast, even the 
small- and medium-sized cities rapidly break 
their continuity with the natural environment 
They become 'dehumanized', although strictly 
speaking they are an exclusively human prod-
uct: there are practically no trees to be seen, the 
'green belt ' becomes an abstraction referred to 
by administrators but invisible to the inhabi-
tants of these cities; and finally, reinforced 
concrete conceals the transformed natural en-
vironment. 
In this sense, urbanization in Brazil, al-
though 'well distributed', is also incapable of 
preventing the environmental problems de-
rived from the process. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that 
figures often hide the facts. A Brazilian city of 
100 000 inhabitants may indeed fall in love 
with skyscrapers and concrete, and will always 
be distinguished by some architectural insult 
directed at the sky. But beneath the 'created 
support ' there does not pulse an urban cul-
ture ' in the European sense: no theatre life, no 
talks and lectures, no film-making, nothing of 
what usually characterizes 'modern life', with a 
single enormous, overwhelming exception: the 
forest of television antenna revealing the emer-
gence of a 'mass culture'. 
It is this extraordinary situation of a vital 
base (which breaks with the rural environment 
without having previously passed through the 
stages peculiar to 'urban-capitalist civilization' 
and bursts into the 'mass civilization') which 
sociologically distinguishes the country's 'ur-
banization'. Strictly speaking, 'mass civiliza-
tion' exists only in some metropolitan areas, but 
it appears symbolically, as an aspiration and in 
caricaturized form, in the network of little-big 
cities with their skyscrapers and televisions, 
sometimes without industrialization and near-
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ly always without a social environment capable 
of genuinely sustaining a mass civilization. 
In the caustic pages of Tristes tropiques 
Levi-Strauss, referring to American urbaniza-
tion in general (with his European-capitalist 
sensibilities, naturally) lamented the fact that 
the cities of the continent were becoming deca-
den t without first having known civilization. In 
a less allegorical manner, we would say that 
Brazilian urbanization is the product of an 
energet ic invasion by oligopolitical capital-
ism, which destroys the existing precarious 
balance in the country/city relationship (that is 
to say, it renews the social division of labour); 
and indeed, rather than tending towards the 
formation of an urban base compatible with the 
' n e w society' it puts everyone in the same 
drawer and locks it through speculation in 
urban land, combining rich areas with poverty-
stricken ones, both of which often lacking the 
basic infrastructure for water, light, drainage, 
te lephones, etc., characteristic of 'modernity'. 
T h e rich areas are better able to look after 
themselves: when public services are lacking, 
private means replace them at a very high cost 
so as to achieve 'urban' living conditions. The 
poor areas are shanty towns, favelas, where 
malnutrition and infant mortality run rampant. 
At all events, and again recognizing that 
the form of the.Brazilian urbanization process 
derives both from the structural characteristics 
of its agricultural exporting past and from the 
current capitalist integration of society into in-
ternational forms of production (which are now 
penetrat ing the countryside with greater force), 
attention must be drawn to the opportunities 
and alternatives involved in Brazil's urban 
growth. 
Firstly, we feel that any judgement based 
on 'backwards-looking utopias' must be avoid-
ed. T h e rural past was always precarious for the 
poor; even today, the greater supply of educa-
tion, health and wages to be found in the cities 
remains decisive in stimulating migration. This 
precariousness and instability means that they 
cannot be viewed as a genuine basis for an 
'jndustrial mass civilization'; and this should 
b e emphasized not in order to idealize the rural 
past, but rather to force the urban alternatives 
for the future to be improved. 
Second, it should be stated that the 'mod-
ern ' underdeveloped city (although it may be 
overpopulated) is the locus par excellence of 
the mass form of capitalist pillage. Here it is 
that the mass of wage-earners (minus the sector 
of wage-earners who in fact pocket the return 
on capital — 'executives' and the like) suffer 
in the same conditions the effects of the capital-
ist-oligopolitical civilization. In practice, it is in 
the city, and especially in the large city, that 
bad collective transport systems, environmen-
tal pollution, lack of green areas and lack of 
drainage suddenly become rife; in short, that 
the diseases of a society which 'grew' econom-
ically more rapidly than it 'developed' social-
ly are manifested. 
This melting-pot, wherein the mass of sala-
ried workers is dissolved in the harshness of 
life, unites persons and groups from different 
structural situations; the factory worker and the 
bank employee, the company lawyer and the 
industrial labourer. Hence the enormous im-
portance of both wage demands and urban pro-
tests: they unite aspirations and struggles 
which were separated during the period of the 
competitive capitalism of the 'integrated ci-
ties ' . 
In the Brazilian case, movements to trans-
form life through urban demands are just be-
ginning. But just as energy alternatives were 
vigorously proposed in recent years, it must be 
expected that the future of Brazilian develop-
ment will be largely linked to the direction of 
urban options. The existence as mentioned 
earlier of a reasonable urban network makes it 
possible to take decentralizing measures in 
urban policy, which will depend not so much 
on industrial localization, a problem of which 
the policy makers are currently aware, as on an 
understanding of two types of interrelated 
phenomenon; that there will be substantial 
improvements in the living conditions of urban 
populations only if they organize to express 
themselves through urban movements and pro-
tests, and if the 'social policies' are decentral-
izing in nature. 
So far, little has been done in this con-
nexion. Public budgets are increasingly con-
centrated in the hands of the central govern-
ment (as was to be expected in military-authori-
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tarian régimes), at the expense of the provinces 
and municipalities. Health and education 
plans, in addition to being 'private-oriented', 
do not actively extend these services to the 
country or to small cities. Housing plans, as has 
already been mentioned, tend to strengthen 
large-scale capitalist accumulation and when 
channel led to the construction of housing they 
give preference to the middle- and high-in-
come strata. We could continue enumerating 
problems of this type. 
In conclusion, it may be said that the urban 
base has expanded, an with it, the services 
We have already noted a relative advantage of 
the Brazilian development process: the exis-
tence of plentiful virgin land which can be de-
veloped. In terms of alternative policies, how-
ever, this relative advantage is being reduced 
as a result of the style of development which 
concentrates wealth and depoils both men and 
nature. 
T h e history of the incorporation of virgin 
land into Brazil's capitalist economy is long and 
repeti t ious, stretching from the individual act 
of daring of the old settler who penetrated the 
jungle to the expulsion of this same posseiro 
(homesteader) of his descendants by the large 
landowners — or, as happens today, by the cap-
italist enterprises. Nothing in all this is peculiar 
to the Amazon region. 
What is unique is the gigantic scale of the 
areas involved, the violence of the working 
methods used, the 'advanced capitalist' na-
ture of the initiatives, and the decisive role of 
the State (and the military régime) in shaping 
the 'new conquest ' . Furthermore, all of this 
takes place within the framework of a debat-
able ecological policy (if one exists) which 
purely and simply leads to the depredation of 
the country's natural heritage. 
In the past, the process of settling the Ama-
zon basin has followed the course of the rivers 
which it entails; however, this entire process 
has reflected the general pattern of concen-
trating development. There has been an accen-
tuation of the old trend toward a nearly total 
break between the city and the country, and its 
effects have not been reduced as in the United 
States and Europe, by the creation of a techno-
logical base pertaining to the 'supercity' of 
industrial civilization. The latter has consisted 
more of the 'external' aspects of the mass cul-
ture that reach the small cities than of material 
resources actually made available to the inhab-
itants. 
F and concentrated fairly large settlements on 
the river banks. Belén and Manaos, for exam-
ple, are important cities and even at the start of 
the century provided a reasonable basis for 
I urban life. In that period, rubber could be ex-
i ploited by employing abundant migrant labour 
I from the northeast: the region's population in-
creased from 400 000 in 1872 to 1 400 000 in 
t 1920. The rubber-producing economy de-
[ creased in importance after the First World 
t War, but the activity did not disappear, and 
. with it there was always Brazil nut harvesting. 
, These forms ofeconomic activity which exploit 
. the workers, although based on the large plan-
tation and the domination of the economic 
r system by traders and importers, did not affect 
the natural base which served to sustain the 
economy. The same was true of mining, basi-
5 cally of gold and precious stones, and stock-
» raising. Such a precarious economic base did 
" not even come to constitute a solid local bour-
geoisie, although it was able to attract hundreds 
= of thousands of migrant workers who under-
s went the bitter experience of the northeast's 
deprivation in the poverty of the Amazon. The 
\. owners of the large tracts of land and the rubber 
* producers (known as 'seringalistas') lived in 
constant debt to the local traders who, for their 
- part, turned for resources and liquidity to the 
s representatives of the major export-import 
III 
The Settlement of New Areas: the Amazon Basin 
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firms (generally foreigners), who lent money at 
high interest rates. 
Under the State's initiative, an end was 
recently put to this situation. The advance of 
large-scale capitalism in the central-southern 
area of the country made possible the transfer 
of financial resources to the Amazon; the ad-
vance both of enterprises and of the modern 
capitalist State, which managed the common 
interests of the propertied class. In Brazil's 
ease, the latter is based both on local enterprise 
and on multinational corporations; and indeed, 
to undertake the conquest of the Amazon, for-
eign capital was called in from the start (cur-
rently, around sixty large foreign enterprises 
operate in the area). 
It would be wrong, however, to «suppose 
that a process on such a scale could get under-
way without involving extra-economic inter-
ests. On the contrary, in the case of the Amazon, 
ever since interest in the region was revived 
with the government of Castello Branco and 
especially from 1967 to 1973, geopolitical mo-
tives were constantly invoked to justify State 
activity in the region. The problem of the 'po-
pulation vacuum' in the area, despite the fu-
ture risks of 'foreign greed', and the fascina-
tion with a mythical Eldorado which was imag-
ined as (if not paved with gold), at least over-
flowing with other mineral and natural re-
sources, were among the motives and projects 
which led to the current policy of populating 
and profiting from the Amazon. 
Among the development options for tack-
l ing the Amazon problem there was an enor-
mous range of possibilities. The area had been 
penetra ted centuries ago under a strategy 
which consisted of settling the areas next to the 
rivers and using them to penetrate the jungle, 
while establishing military settlements in the 
frontiers. The land largely belonged to the local 
states, or jits ownership was in doubt. 
At first, nothing seemed better than to 
establish rational plans for the distribution of 
the land among those who worked it so that, 
based on populated nuclei, the jungle could be 
penetrated without being destroyed. But this 
was not the strategy that was followed. Prefer-
ence was given to the proposal for a daring 
plan: the construction of a trans-Amazonian 
highway to transfer settlers from the northeast 
and distribute them in nuclei scattered 
throughout that vast area- Simultaneously, it 
was decided to concentrate vast financial re-
sources in the hands of major private investors,8 
who would undertake on a large scale the pen-
etration of the jungle so as subsequently to 
begin stock-breeding and crop-raising activi-
ties. Especially in the period 1970 to 1974, this 
was masked under the ideology of 'national 
greatness' , together with mining which, natu-
rally, was undertaken through large enter-
prises, nearly always multinational, or through 
joint ventures with them. A by-product of this 
process has been enormous land speculation, 
including the sale of large areas to foreigners 
and all sorts of frauds with respect to property 
deeds, leading to violence when attempts are 
made to dislodge the old settlers. 
T h e results óf this impressive policy to 
benefit the major enterprises were not long in 
appearing: after 1974 (the Geisel government), 
the rate of colonization began to decrease, as 
did the interest in constructing roads such as 
the trans-Amazon which, after running from 
east to west (consequently, paralleling the 
Amazon river some hundreds of kilometers to 
the south), links areas with small capacity to 
generate intensive road traffic. But the strategy 
s T h e best-known case oí foreign investment is that of 
Jari Florestal e Agropecuaria, which owns 1.5 millions hec-
tares, covering around 12 000 km2 and potentially 36 000 
km2. The owner has already invested around US$ 200 mil-
lion in it, and the total investment (agricultural project) is 
around US$ 300 million. The industrial project (including 
electricity power stations and pulp mills) amounts to US$ 
400 million. The project is administered in close contact 
with the Government by retired military officers, whom the 
enterprise recruits/ 
In the case of enterprises operating in the south of the 
country, it may be noted that these investments are made 
with significant fiscal support through financing and the 
transfer of income taxes to capital fbnnation destined for 
the Amazon region. Furthermore, in some cases there are 
customs exemptions for equipment imports. 
The present government is prepared to transfer, on the 
basis of 'risk agreements', 12 areas totalling 40 million 
hectares for siting the first productive forests. If we are to 
believe official statements, this will all take place while 
respecting the ecological requirements necessary to pre-
serve the jungle. There are official suggestions for in-
creasing the obligatory forested area (currently at 50%) for 
agricultural enterprises. It must be noted, however, that 
whatever the criteria adopted, their application and control 
are extremely uncertain in such an extensive area which is 
so poorly controlled administratively. 
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of settling the Amazon through large enter-
prises was not only maintained, but accentu-
ated. Policies were not formulated that could 
unite the scattered population, which made 
colonization difficult, nor was as attempt made 
to distribute the land so that it could be worked; 
rather, policies which concentrated ownership 
and exploited the workers were implemented. 
Furthermore, despite the protests of ecolo-
gista and anthropologists, the forests were not 
protected, nor did the indigenous populations 
receive any benefit. It should be pointed out 
that there are still indigenous groups in the 
Amazon which have no contacts with other 
peoples , a situation unparalleled anywhere 
else on the planet, and of enormous cultural 
significance. But none of this is given due con-
sideration. The argument in favour of conquest 
is simple and vulgar: it is noted that 'not even 
4% of its 5 million km2 has so far been ex-
ploited' , and that consequently there is no 
reason to worry (in this connexion, see the 
statements of the Minister of the Interior, in the 
newspaper O Estado de Sào Paulo, 7 April 
1979). It is difficult to determine how many of 
the 260 million hectares of the Amazon jungle 
were affected; perhaps, in fact, not even 10%. 
But the problem is not size but the trend which 
this indicates. 
After severe criticism was directed at the 
policy of conquest and colonization in the peri-
od up to 1974, the Government decided to 'ex-
ploit the jungle rationally'. What does this 
strategy, reaffirmed by the current Govern-
ment , consist of? Basically, it means stimu-
lating only the major agricultural projects (a 
criterion already adopted by the previous ad-
ministration and applied south of Para and 
north of the Matto Grosso) and colonization 
projects, handing over the latter activity to the 
private sector, and especially large-scale wood 
exploitation. 
Generally, ecologists have protested this 
strategy, which consists of treating the hetero-
geneous tropical jungle as a homogeneous 
whole and, as in the already famous Yari Project 
case, of adapting imported vegetable species 
which have varying yields, as wood or as a raw 
material, for pulp, for example. There is thus a 
confrontation between an attitude favouring 
economic calculation and exploitation, which 
even though it pretends to be 'rational' is po-
tentially destructive, and one which seeks to 
preserve the ecosystem. Since 'the Amazon is 
large', the jungle is being destroyed while the 
ecological and social consequences of the 'ma-
jor proyects', which often use semi-forced la-
bour9 and always, due to the very nature of the 
task of penetrating the jungle, apply extraordi-
nary roughness in the use of human labour, are 
being discussed. 
The pace at which the jungle is penetrated 
may be very rapid. The world market for 'non-
coniferous' wood, such as the wood from trop-
ical jungle trees, is growing extremely rapidly, 
whereas the supply is decreasing. It is calcu-
lated that the jungles of Southeast Asia will last 
more or less 27 to 30 years and the African 
jungles, between 13 and 30 years; these are the 
major suppliers. Consequently, there is an 
ample market for Amazonian wood. 
For this reason, in Brazilian forest re-
sources the opposite of what happens with pe-
troleum takes place: we have a renewable and 
abundant resource available to us. Based on 
this criterion, if a high degree of ecological 
awareness could be maintained it would actu-
ally be possible to incorporate the Amazon into 
the international economy without destroying 
the natural heritage. And if the régime would 
orient itself to benefit the population, it would 
have to do so without recourse to over-exploita-
tion of the labour force, as currently takes place. 
But to what extent is this feasible? 
Again, as in the case of energy and the 
urban problem, it is not a matter of the physical 
limits to development (because abundance is 
involved here) but of the limits of the economic 
system and the current socio-political order. 
Despite official statements and reports and the 
technological resources available, it is clear 
that the form of incorporation of the Amazon 
derives from an internationalized oligopolistic 
economy which finds in the State (with all its 
contradictions and conflicts) a basic supporter 
for rapid accumulation. 
yFor a more detailed analysis of this process and of the 
sett lement of the Amazon, see F . H. Cardoso and G. Muller, 
Amazonia: expansáo do capitalismo, Sâo Paulo, Ed. Brasi-
liense, CEBRAP, 1977. 
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IV 
Final Remarks 
In the light of the above, in what terms should 
the problem of the alternatives and prospects of 
Brazilian development and the State's role in it 
be considered? Few underdeveloped coun-
tries have as broad a natural resource base and a 
population volume similar to Brazil's for under-
taking a development strategy whose touch-
stone is self-reliance. The very cultural base 
which is available and the 'sophistication' of 
the technical decision-making parties theoreti-
cally would ensure this opportunity. The case 
of energy which is briefly outlined here actual-
ly exemplifies the manner in which the alterna-
tive technology challenge is within the reach of 
the country's resources. The size of the domes-
tic market and the economy's dynamism do not 
weaken this hypothesis. 
However, it is not a question merely of 
changing the 'style of development' so as to 
give the new style the will to be independent, 
nor may it be imagined that the State apparatus, 
so sophisticated in tenns of organization and 
techniques , will direct its policies to attend to 
basic social needs. The Amazon case, although 
discussed briefly, indicates that the State acts 
as a lever to promote the growth of the large 
private enterprise, and that in the latter it sees 
an engine capable of promoting colonization, 
the penetration of the jungle and the exploita-
tion of minerals and wood. It is true that in the 
Brazilian case the State has also become an 
entrepreneur. But its principal investment 
agencies (like the BNDE), and even its policy 
regarding prices, purchases and the expansion 
through joint ventures of State enterprises, 
constitute a basic component of the capitalist 
system of accumulation. 
In other words, and expressed more direct-
ly, let us say that the prospects for Brazilian 
economic growth are many; the opportunities 
which will open up in connexion with the pre-
servation of cultural autonomy, the natural her-
itage and the satisfaction of the population's 
social needs will depend upon political 
changes sufficiently profound so as to counter-
act, if not radically change, the trend towards an 
economy based on oligopoly and international-
ization. If this should take place, the problem 
then arises of the possibility of socialism in a 
country which is industrializing on the periph-
ery of the world economy; but this subject is 
obviously beyond the scope of this work. 
